Deconstruction

 So, I figure if Leeman is going to try to go with Derrida's original meaning for "Deconstruction" we should hold him to it. First, however, if he wants to play the game: learn to use the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy when talking about philosophers/philosophy. It is the Wikipedia of philosophy.

So, Derrida's deconstruction:

Well, according to the SEP, which I'll go with since I'm not actually a Derrida scholar, there are three of these, or three aspects of it.

1. Deconstruction as pervasive egalitarianism opposing unfounded hierarchy:

Simply, deconstruction is a criticism of Platonism, which is defined by the belief that existence is structured in terms of oppositions (separate substances or forms) and that the oppositions are hierarchical, with one side of the opposition being more valuable than the other. The first phase of deconstruction attacks this belief by reversing the Platonistic hierarchies...

In order to clarify deconstruction’s “two phases,” let us restrict ourselves to one specific opposition, the opposition between appearance and essence. Prior to Derrida, Nietzsche had also criticized this opposition, and it is criticized in a lot of Twentieth Century philosophy. So, in Platonism, essence is more valuable than appearance. In deconstruction however, we reverse this, making appearance more valuable than essence. How? Here we could resort to empiricist arguments (in Hume for example) that show that all knowledge of what we call essence depends on the experience of what appears. But then, this argumentation would imply that essence and appearance are not related to one another as separate oppositional poles. The argumentation in other words would show us that essence can be reduced down to a variation of appearances (involving the roles of memory and anticipation). The reduction is a reduction to what we can call “immanence,” which carries the sense of “within” or “in.” So, we would say that what we used to call essence is found in appearance, essence is mixed into appearance. Now, we can back track a bit in the history of Western metaphysics. On the basis of the reversal of the essence-appearance hierarchy and on the basis of the reduction to immanence, we can see that something like a decision (a perhaps impossible decision) must have been made at the beginning of the metaphysical tradition, a decision that instituted the hierarchy of essence-appearance and separated essence from appearance. This decision is what really defines Platonism or “metaphysics.” After this retrospection, we can turn now to a second step in the reversal-reduction of Platonism, which is the second “phase” of deconstruction. The previously inferior term must be re-inscribed as the “origin” or “resource” of the opposition and hierarchy itself.

 2. Deconstruction as historical understanding of or as understanding the incoherence in current systems:

This first definition of deconstruction as two phases gives way to the refinement we find in the “Force of Law” (which dates from 1989–1990). This second definition is less metaphysical and more political. In “Force of Law,” Derrida says that deconstruction is practiced in two styles (Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, p. 21). These “two styles” do not correspond to the “two phases” in the earlier definition of deconstruction. On the one hand, there is the genealogical style of deconstruction, which recalls the history of a concept or theme. Earlier in his career, in Of Grammatology, Derrida had laid out, for example, the history of the concept of writing. But now what is at issue is the history of justice. On the other hand, there is the more formalistic or structural style of deconstruction, which examines a-historical paradoxes or aporias.

3. Deconstruction as the aspiration to fulfilling paradox:

The third definition of deconstruction can be found in an essay from 2000 called “Et Cetera.” Here Derrida in fact presents the principle that defines deconstruction:

Each time that I say ‘deconstruction and X (regardless of the concept or the theme),’ this is the prelude to a very singular division that turns this X into, or rather makes appear in this X, an impossibility that becomes its proper and sole possibility, with the result that between the X as possible and the ‘same’ X as impossible, there is nothing but a relation of homonymy, a relation for which we have to provide an account…. For example, here referring myself to demonstrations I have already attempted …, gift, hospitality, death itself (and therefore so many other things) can be possible only as impossible, as the im-possible, that is, unconditionally (Deconstructions: a User’s Guide, p. 300, my emphasis).

All three of these quotes are from the SEP article linked above. None deny the reality of genuine truth. It would not at all shock me if "objective truth" was one of those things "possible only as impossible," but that does not mean that we cannot aspire to it, just as we aspire to justice and to grace.

The above series of quotes has probably not clarified things all that much, however. There's a bunch of weird language Derrida seems to have constructed to elaborate his concept of deconstruction, and it is just as likely to leave one feeling lost as anything. Let me, then, provide a kind of gloss--my own working account of deconstruction. Perhaps it will be helpful to others trying to find their way on this path, or perhaps someone will come along and go, "this is not what I mean," but at least be clearer about how they wish to pursue their path to seek the True, the Good, and the Beautiful.

1. Deconstruction expects "truth" to be a goal, not a destination. We may ever approximate it but should never feel confident that we have arrived. There is an impossibility to truth, and indeed to holiness, which nevertheless calls us to pursue it.

2. Deconstruction takes a system and a practice as it stands, playing the parts against each other, watching them carefully, and pokes at just the moment to show... It is incoherent. In this sense, deconstruction has resonances with presuppositional apologetic strategies of showing the incoherence--from within--of alternative beliefs.

3. Deconstruction attends to the history of practices and doctrines to understand how the train of thought has been tainted. In Christian terms, deconstruction is always aware that sin has played a part in the construction of systems and practices and seeks to understand what that part has been in order to pursue a purer orthopraxy--right practice.

4. Deconstruction is not something we do, although we may act in the spirit of deconstruction: resist it or accept it. Rather, deconstruction occurs as the tensions in our lives erupt, as our thoughts come to light as incompatible, and we are forced to decide--or recognize the undecidability--between one view and another.

This fourth is rather important for understanding the current wave of people "deconstructing their faith." In the best cases, these are people who have reached a point where they have learned two conflicting things from their faith communities and have chosen to side (decide, de-side--puns are good deconstructive humor) with the offense of the Gospel rather than the comfort of their communities.