Euthyphro, Rocks, and Mystery
Euthyphro Are things good because God says so or does God say they are good because they already are? Saying they are good simply because God says so seems to leave open the possibility of a world where slaughtering infants was good, but saying they are good and God just reports that fact seems to infringe upon God's freedom. Solutions vary, but all I'm aware of try to somehow collapse the distinction. Either you say that things are good because a loving God says so, or you say that God causes things to be good be creating the world in a certain way and then reports on the normative facts he created in creating the world. I think it is helpful to distinguish here between three distinct sorts of grounding relations: 1. Ontological grounding: what makes it the case that x (where x is a way things are ethically or morally). This is (primarily, at least) what the Euthyphro dilemma is about. 2. Epistemological grounding: how do we know that p (where p is some proposition in ethics ...